We develop a model that combines competitive exchange of private commodities across endogenously formed groups with public good provision and global collective decisions. There is a tension between local and global collective decisions. In particular, we show that group formation and collective...

Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Aufteilung eines Budgets auf mehrere öffentliche Güter mittels einer Abstimmung. Hierzu betrachten wir Abstimmungsregeln, unter denen jeder Agent eine Budgetaufteilung vorschlägt und dann aus diesen Vorschlägen eine Budgetaufteilung (Allokation) bestimmt...

We study the problem of providing two public goods on tree networks, in which each agent has a single-peaked preference. We show that if the number of agents is at least four, then there exists no social choice rule that satisfies efficiency and replacement-domination. In fact, it is shown that...

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp. 203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjöström, and...

This paper considers a mechanism where provider of public good reflects donor's preference on public good. When asking individuals and private companies to contribute for certain public good, it is widely known that the total contributions result in under-provision. Among a lot of...

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the...