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A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702781
winner's payment to the seller. De Marzo et al. (2005) show that in an environment with risk-neutral seller and bidders …, steeper securities increase the seller's expected revenue but do not affect the efficiency of the auction. We introduce risk … insurance levels the field for more risk-averse bidders, inducing them to bid more aggressively and improving the revenue and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865568
Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of their competitors' valuations is restricted to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946017
We analyze security-bid auctions in which two risk-neutral sellers compete for risk-averse bidders. Sellers face a … risk-averse, all equilibria are symmetric. Meanwhile, when they are heterogeneously risk-averse, there is always an … equilibrium in which one seller chooses a steeper family to serve the more-risk-averse bidders, while the other chooses a flatter …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289775
common knowledge, except that bidders have private degrees of aversion to downside-risk. In this model, the optimal FPA … risk or risk aversion generally leads to lower equilibrium bids. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374400
In this paper we use an experiment to compare a theory of risk aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for … overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and … spite can be used to rationalize deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions. We exploit that equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002983
In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125720
be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences, and (iii) the auction can have a binding … reserve price. Our analysis reveals that the premium has an intricate joint effect on risk sharing and expected revenue, which … in general benefits risk averse bidders. When the seller is more risk averse than the pivotal bidder - a condition often …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234599
We develop a model which combines general risk-averse preferences with anticipated loss aversion to explain bidding … behavior in the first-price auction, where both risk-aversion and loss aversion induce ‘overbidding.' We then show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843631
We analyze takeover operations in which (i) bidding firms are risk-averse; (ii) offers can be made using cash or equity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014258241