I designed an experiment to study the persistence of the prevailing levels of reasoning across games. Instead of directly comparing the k-level(s) of reasoning for each game, I used cognitive load to manipulate the strategic environment by imposing variations on the subject's cost of reasoning...

The following analysis is meant to contribute to a history of rational choice theory. More specifically, I provide a multi-layered account of rational choice theory in terms of its biography as a scientific object. I argue that its axiomatic version, choice theory traveled between different...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoner's dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in...

This chapter reviews recent experimental data testing game theory and behavioral models that have been inspired to explain those data. The models fall into four groups: in cognitive hierarchy or level- k models, the assumption of equilibrium is relaxed by assuming agents have beliefs about other...