We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean field equilibrium and it is shown to be the limit of...

We introduce a mean field game with rank-based reward: competing agents optimize their effort to achieve a goal, are ranked according to their completion time, and paid a reward based on their relative rank. First, we propose a tractable Poissonian model in which we can describe the optimal...

We propose a continuous-time model of trading among risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs. Agents face quadratic costs-of-carry on their positions and as a consequence, their marginal valuation of the asset decreases when the magnitude of their position increases, as it would be the...

We study strategic interactions between firms with heterogeneous beliefs about future climate impacts. To that end, we propose a Cournot-type equilibrium model where firms choose mitigation efforts and production quantities such as to maximize the expected profits under their subjective beliefs....