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In the United States, prospective foster parents must become licensed by a child welfare agency before a foster child can be placed in their care. This paper contributes by developing a theoretical matching model to study the optimal menu of licenses designed to screen foster parents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540941
This paper studies the menu of licenses designed by the child welfare agency to screen foster parents. We develop a two-sided matching model with heterogeneous agents, search frictions, private information, and a designer who coordinates match formation through a menu of contracts. We focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347852
We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842986
I study group lending with joint-liability contracts offered by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). I develop a model of group lending where heterogeneous agents form groups, obtain capital from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. This paper shows that the composition of the groups is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833626
Commitment exists in various contexts and forms in economics. It appears in a particularwayin dynamic many-to-one matching markets when matchings are irreversible: Institutionsmaycommit to matching with specific agents early on to affect the subsequent matchingmarket in their favor. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296563
In the United States, prospective foster parents must become licensed by a child welfare agency before a foster child can be placed in their care. This paper contributes by developing a theoretical matching model to study the optimal menu of licenses designed to screen foster parents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014450497
I consider a repeated principal-agent model with moral hazard, in which the agent has βδ-preferences, which are widely used to capture time-inconsistency. I analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting. I characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048185