Markets, auction mechanisms and political institutions all affect outcomes. For students of collective choice, minimal decision making institutions provide a baseline by which we expect outcomes that best can be characterized as chaotic. Such outcomes are rarely predictable and the processes by...

This chapter discusses that experiments demonstrate the extent to which outcomes are responsive to the structure of preferences. Where a preference-induced equilibrium exists, outcomes converge toward that equilibrium. Where a natural majority coalition exists, outcomes cluster around it. Where...

Coordination problems are easily solved when there are clear and unambiguous signals. Institutional mechanisms that enhance the clarity of signals enables even cheap talk to work as a coordinating mechanism. On the other hand, learning about signals, especially if there is path-dependent noise...

Behavioral economics has become an important part of the economics profession. As a subfield, it tries to make sense of persistent violations of the standard model for economics. The major classes of violations involve social preferences (taking the well-being of others into account), time...

Empirical evidence suggests that there are important spillovers as-sociated with the operations of multinational enterprises. Spillovers may occur when less advanced, local firms learn from their more ad-vanced, foreign competitors. But less advanced firms may also actively seek knowledge by...