We document that acquirer announcement returns and post-M&A performance rise with a target's proportion of intangible assets. This shareholder wealth creation is associated with profitable acquirers purchasing complementary intangible assets and promising growth options from less profitable...

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory of corporate philanthropy, we find that as giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are also associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural...

We find that acquisitions exhibit less evidence of agency problems when the target possesses more intangible assets. Acquisitions of intangibles are associated with higher announcement returns, superior post-acquisition performance, and less free cash flow, mitigating empire-building concerns....

We find that corporate giving represents a private benefit of control that distorts corporate investment and financing activity, consistent with free cash flow agency theory. Corporate giving discourages managers from pursuing external financing, especially debt issuance, to minimize outside...