The disaster myopia hypothesis is a theoretical argument that may explain why crises are a recurrent event. Under very optimistic circumstances, investors disregard any relevant information concerning the increasing degree of risk. Agents' propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse...

The disaster myopia hypothesis is a theoretical argument that may explain why crises are a recurrent event. Under very optimistic circumstances, investors disregard any relevant information concerning the increasing degree of risk. Agents’ propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse...

Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial...

Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial...

Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

The model of Morris and Shin [2002] shows that imprecise public announcements can coordinate the actions of speculators far from the fundamental because of over-reaction to announcements. The strong focal potential of common knowledge is welfare damaging when it induces over-reaction to an...

The accommodating monetary policy of the 70s is usually rationalized within the Barro-Gordon framework. By contrast, this article shows that, even in the absence of inflationary bias, a credible central bank finds it optimal to accommodate monetary policy in response to cost-push shocks whenever...

In an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known, the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role: as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank's assessment to firms. Because mark-up shocks cannot be...

This paper addresses the question of whether public information destabilizes the economy in the context of signals of a different nature. We present an experimental evaluation of the speculative attack game of <link rid="b12">Morris and Shin (1998</link>). Our objective is two-fold: to evaluate whether public...