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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540724
Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the “volatility paradox” (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always call for more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015257463
Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the 'volatility paradox' (Brunnermeier and Sannikov,2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always call for more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913903
It is well-established that in bargaining under complete information, two agents reach an agreement immediately. I assume that nature selects a state that favors one or the other, and the agents may not know the state with probability ε, inducing higher- order uncertainty. A unique equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219808
Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the 'volatility paradox' (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always call for more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011866379
Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the “volatility paradox” (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial stability/tranquility always call...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901469
This paper studies the Rubinstein bargaining game with frequent offers, in which both agents have reservation values. Agents are uncertain whether their opponents have high or low reservation values. As agents try to best each other, a unique distribution of delay emerges similar to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848189
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431169
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012205904
In a regime change game, agents sequentially decide whether to attack or not, without observing the past actions by others. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy - repeated viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854068