This paper provides a new strategic underpinning of the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution that is widely applied in search-matching models of the labor market. This 'intertemporal surplus sharing' (ISS) solution is usually defended as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a strategic...

This paper develops a dynamic econometric framework for the analysis of entry, exit, and competitive conduct in oligopolistic markets. This framework only requires panel data on the demand and producer counts of geographically dispersed markets over time. It is a dynamic extension of Bresnahan...

This paper establishes the existence and uniqueness of an intuitively-refined Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in a richly-specified dynamic duopoly model of entry and exit. We develop an algorithm that computes it very quickly, which makes the model useful for experiments that use many parameter...

This chapter develops three topics. (1) Identification of the distributions of treatment effects and the distributions of agent subjective evaluations of treatment effects. Methods for identifying ex ante and ex post distributions are presented and empirical examples are given. (2)...

We present a structural model of firm growth, learning, and survival and consider its identification and estimation. In the model, entrepreneurs have private and possibly error-ridden observations of persistent and transitory shocks to profit. We demonstrate that the model's parameters can be...

This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any...