the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether … they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the …

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students … Mechanism (IDAM), inspired by procedures currently being used to match millions of students to public universities in Brazil and …

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking … students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of …, we solve and compare the equilibria of "centralized college admissions" (CCA) in which students apply to all colleges …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams …. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college … admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to …

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams …. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of "centralized college admissions …" (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and "decentralized college admissions" (DCA) where students only apply to one …

students and higher education institutions (HEIs). Matching theory predicts the existence of perfect matching between the two … universities and applicant abilities are assessed. It is shown that although in most cases favorable matching results are …

. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …

In this paper, I investigate matching problems where priorities and preferences are misaligned. In the case of … centralized college admissions, students are matched based on their test scores in standardized tests (priorities), a noisy … realization of their aptitudes (colleges' preferences) due to measurement errors. I show that in this case any matching mechanism …

to seek evidence to enhance self-esteem, there is left-digit bias in this life-changing decision. Students with scores …