all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric model allowing both the leader?s and the …

payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy, to which the second player always chooses a best reply. This … that, as a set, the leader's payoffs in equilibrium are at least as high as his Nash and correlated equilibrium payoffs in …

This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash … leader payoff, or even lower than in the simultaneous game. This gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed … monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the …

when some firms have first-mover advantage. We find that in a leader-follower structure a bilateral merger is always … profitable when a leader and a follower merge together and the merged firm behaves like a leader. But, a bilateral merger between …

We offer a new respective to the social efficiency of entry by considering an industry with a quantity setting leader … insufficient depends on the identity of the leader (which is either domestic or foreign), the marginal cost difference between the … leader and the followers, and whether there are scale economies. In a closed economy, entry is socially excessive …