This paper studies the pricing incentives of a monopolist constrained by a revenue cap endogenously determined by her costs in a so-called base year. Such regulation is employed, among others, to govern electricity distribution operators in Germany. We show that the revenue cap may incentivize...

This paper investigates how human societies sustain positive levels of cooperation through transmitting and enforcing norms. It introduces an evolutionary model that distinguishes between three distinct dynamic dimensions: behavior, norms, and approval preferences. These dimensions differ...

This paper examines Political Budget Cycles in federal systems, focusing on how a central incumbent allocates discretionary transfers across states in response to electoral incentives. We develop a theoretical model predicting that average discretionary transfers increase during federal election...

This paper studies the pricing incentives of a monopolist constrained by a revenue cap endogenously determined by her costs in a so-called base year. Such regulation is employed, among others, to govern electricity distribution operators in Germany. We show that the revenue cap may incentivize...

This paper examines how societies can conserve common-pool resources (CPRs) through the cultural transmission of norms. To this end, we introduce an evolutionary model that endogenizes the formation of personal, social, and descriptive norms, thereby unifying existing economic theories on norm...