designed to satisfy additional conditions of interim coalition rationality, interim ambiguity insurance, and ex-post budget …-proofness may be achieved by engineering ambiguity in mechanism rules …

We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and … ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players' preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility, as characterized … analysis shows that ambiguity aversion can lead to behavioral implications that are distinct from those attained under expected …

definitions of ambiguity in the literature. Location invariance is applied to normal form games where players perceive strategic … ambiguity. The set of translations of a given set of priors is shown to be isomorphic to the probability simplex. Thus … considering mixtures of translations has a convexifying effect similar to considering mixed strategies in the absence of ambiguity …

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and … ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple … equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements. …

attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian … strategic advantage in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable … preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games. …

pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face …. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in … these classes of games. …

This chapter is devoted to the study of Nash equilibria, and correlated equilibria in both finite and infinite games …. We restrict our discussions to only those properties that are somewhat special to the case of two-person games. Many of … these properties fail to extend even to three-person games. The existence of quasi-strict equilibria, and the uniqueness of …

refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self …-enforcing theory of rational behavior in non-cooperative games. Given the assumption of independent behavior of the players, it follows … a unilateral deviation. Nash equilibria exist and for generic (finite) games there is a finite number of Nash …