We propose a computationally feasible inference method in finite games of complete information. Galichon and Henry, 2011 and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari, 2011 show that the empirical content in such models is characterized by a collection of moment inequalities whose number increases...

We propose a computationally feasible inference method infinite games of complete information. Galichon and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show that such models are equivalent to a collection of moment inequalities that increases exponentially with the number of...

We propose a computationally feasible inference method in finite games of complete information. Galichon and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show that the empirical content in such models is characterized by a collection of moment inequalities whose number increases...

We analyze the empirical content of the Roy model, stripped down to its essential features, namely sector specific unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection on the basis of potential outcomes. We characterize sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes and testable...

In many set-identified models, it is difficult to obtain a tractable characterization of the identified set. Therefore, researchers often rely on nonsharp identification conditions, and empirical results are often based on an outer set of the identified set. This practice is often viewed as...

This paper studies the decision made by a family to invest in student migration. We propose an empirical structural decision model which reflects the importance of both the return to the investment and the budgetary constraint in the choice of the family. We circumvent the problem of endogeneity...

This paper develops and tests a model of profit-sharing arrangement over returns to a student migration investment. Taking advantage of a unique dataset on Cameroonian students, I find evidence of non-commitment bargaining between student, parents and an outside helper. The commitment problem...