This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...

In a two-sided asymmetric information market, the role of the accuracy of consumers' imperfect and private information on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but noisy private signal of quality. The product offered in...

This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding product quality. A revising agent observes a small sample of actions played in the population and also receives a private signal indicating the realized state. Using a simple heuristic, the agent...

A sender is seeking approval from the receiver(s). He conducts experiments to two receivers with identical preferences sequentially. The first receiver can approve, reject, or delay the decision to the next receiver while the second receiver must approve or reject. Upon delay, the first receiver...