We develop a theory of bank information sharing, highlighting the interactions between credit and labor markets. A better-informed relationship bank competes with a less informed foreign bank for borrowers under asymmetric information about borrowers' creditworthiness. Credit market competition...

We study a sequential trading mechanism with ambiguity-averse agents modeled by multiple prior preferences. Informed traders employ mixed trading strategies, and their trading probability decreases with the level of ambiguity. If agents are sufficiently ambiguous, informed traders do not trade,...

In a multi-asset market where agents have both payoff and supply signals, the rational expectations equilibria with partially revealing prices are characterized by an algebraic Riccati equation. The equation states that asset prices’ payoff informativeness equals the aggregation of...

This paper presents a spatial model to analyze the effects of the entry of Fintech lenders on credit market competition and welfare. In the model, banks compete with a Fintech lender for borrowers under asymmetric information. Both types of lenders can screen borrowers before making a loan, and...