This paper analyzes the performance consequences of employee stock options for a broad sample of firms during the period 1996-1999. Our tests are performed separately for the top-5 executives and all other employees. We estimate the expected level of option incentives based on each firm's...

This paper assesses whether two popular accounting-based measures, Altman's (1968) Z-Score and an O-Score derived from Ohlson (1980), effectively summarize publicly-available information about the probability of bankruptcy (PB). According to option-pricing theories (Black and Scholes, 1973,...

We assess whether two popular accounting-based measures, Altman's (1968) Z-Score and Ohlson's (1980) O-Score, effectively summarize publicly-available information about the probability of bankruptcy. We compare the relative information content of these Scores to a market-based measure of the...

This article analyzes the impacts that three alternative damage apportionment rules have an owner?s financial reporting decision, an auditor?s audit quality choice, and investors? pricing decisions within the context of a perfectly competitive securities market and owner solvency constraints....

We examine whether compensation consultants' potential cross-selling incentives explain more lucrative CEO pay packages using 755 firms from the Samp;P 1500 for 2006. Critics allege that these incentives lead consultants to bias their advice to secure greater revenues from their clients (Waxman,...

We examine two potential mechanisms through which disclosure quality is expected to reduce information asymmetry: (1) altering the trading incentives of informed and uninformed investors so that there is relatively less trading by privately informed investors, and (2) reducing the likelihood...

This paper examines the association between insider trading before an earnings announcement and the magnitude of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Consistent with insiders' private information being incorporated into prices through their trading, we find PEAD is significantly lower...

We hypothesize that conference calls are voluntary disclosures that lead to long-term reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Cross-sectional and time-series tests show that the level of information asymmetry is negatively associated with conference call activity. We find...

We hypothesize that conference calls are voluntary disclosures that lead to long-term reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Both cross-sectional and time-series tests show that information asymmetry is negatively associated with conference call activity. In particular,...

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between...