Müller (2023) presents evidence for electoral cycles in macroprudential policy in a sample of 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Consistent with theoretical arguments, the pattern of looser regulation is larger when election outcomes are uncertain and institutions are weak. In this...

At least since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, the problem of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) has received widespread attention. The research conducted in this context has, however, generally focused on the econometric aspect and the contribution of the TBTF doctrine to the financial crisis of...

On February 12, 2010, SUERF, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bankwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft continued their established tradition of jointly organised conferences. As evidenced also by the 115 conference participants, this year's subject of "Contagion and Spillovers – New...

We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for...

This paper investigates the relation between corporate political connections and government investment. We study various forms of political influence, ranging from passive connections between firms and politicians, such as those based on politicians’ voting districts, to active forms, such as...

On February 12, 2010, SUERF, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bankwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft continued their established tradition of jointly organised conferences. As evidenced also by the 115 conference participants, this year's subject of "Contagion and Spillovers – New...

In this paper, we discuss whether and how bank lobbying can lead to regulatory capture and have real consequences through an overview of the motivations behind bank lobbying and of recent empirical evidence on the subject. Overall, the findings are consistent with regulatory capture, which...

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 put the spotlight on the problem of too-big-to-fail (TBTF). The research conducted in this context has, however, generally focused on the econometric aspect and the contribution of the TBTF doctrine to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, while the economic...

This paper studies the welfare effects of a “partial banking union” in which cross-country transfers for bailouts are set at the supranational level, but policymakers in member countries decide the distribution of funds. This allows the self-interested policymakers to extract rents in the...

This paper investigates the political ties of too-big-to-fail bank boards in crisis times. I argue that, after a bailout, governments are likely to influence bank board compositions in order to secure control rights. Combining two novel datasets on political ties of banks and state aid in the...