The results of an asset market experiment, in which 64 subjects trade two assets oneight markets in a computerized continuous double auction, indicate that objectivelyirrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and negativelyframed information leads to a particular...

The formation of reference points has drawn increasing interest ever since the introduction of prospect theory. Given that most studies focus on tradable goods such as stocks, for which the prices are observable, while few have focused on environmental goods. This paper attempts to fill this gap...

In auctions where bidders are uncertain of their value and are fully liable for their bids, there exists the potential for losses if bids exceed realized values. Theoretically, bids will be higher if bidders are able to mitigate this downside loss through some form of limited liability. To...

We theoretically and experimentally study independent private value auctions in the presence of bidders who are loss averse in the sense of Köszegi and Rabin (2007). In one specification, we consider gains and losses in two dimensions separately, about whether they receive the object or not,...

We analyze the effects of resale through bargaining in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. The possibility of resale affects bidders' strategies, and hence the allocation of the objects on sale and the seller's revenue. Our experimental design consists of four...

The relevance of projection bias in decision making processes has been widely studied, but not specifically in experimental auctions. We study the role of projection bias in experimental auctions by examining the bidding behavior of hungry and non-hungry subjects on food products delivered...

(...) We provide support for the disposition effect. Participants who experience a gain sell their assets more rapidly than participants who experience a loss, and positively framed subjects generally sell their assets later than negatively framed subjects.

The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...

In auctions where bidders are uncertain of their value and are fully liable for their bids, there exists the potential for losses if bids exceed realized values. Theoretically, bids will be higher if bidders are able to mitigate this downside loss through some form of limited liability. To...

In this paper, we review the recent advances in the literature of experimental auctions and provide practical advice and guidelines for researchers. We focus on issues related to randomization to treatment and causal identification of treatment effects, on design issues such as selection between...