We analyze a model where consumers sequentially search experts for treatment recommendations and prices, facing either zero or a positive search cost, while experts simultaneously compete in these two dimensions. In equilibrium, experts may “cheat” by overstating the severity of a...

We extend Stahl's (1989) model to a setting with differentiated products to study the effects of price-directed consumer search. Consumers engage in costly search to find out whether products meet their needs. Consumer search is directed by prices when they are observable before search, in...

We develop a model in which consumers sequentially search experts for recommendations and prices to treat a problem, and experts simultaneously compete in these two dimensions. Consumers have either zero or a positive search cost. In equilibrium, experts may "cheat" by recommending an...

A durable-good monopolist sells its branded product over two periods. In period 2, when there is entry of a counterfeiter, the branded firm may charge a high price to signal its quality. Counterfeit competition thus enables the branded firm to commit to a high price in period 2, alleviating the...