We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε–perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing from the...

We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy...

We argue that it is natural to study social institutions within the framework of standard game theory (i.e., only by resorting to concepts like players, actions, strategies, information sets, payoff functions, and stochastic processes describing the moves of nature, which constitute a stochastic...

We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an epsilon-perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing form...

We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading...

We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny (1999) and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy $\varepsilon-$equilibria for all epsilon0. We show by examples that there are: (1)...

We present a simple proof of existence of subgame perfect equilibria in games with perfect information.

We establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that...