In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [6] model with aggregate uncertainty, we show that there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers deposit at the bank, all patient consumers wait for the last period to withdraw, and the bank fails with strictly positive...

We argue that it is natural to study social institutions within the framework of standard game theory (i.e., only by resorting to concepts like players, actions, strategies, information sets, payoff functions, and stochastic processes describing the moves of nature, which constitute a stochastic...

We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we will show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible...

Random matching models have been used in Monetary Economics to argue that money can increase the well being of all agents in the economy. If the model features a finite number of agents it will be shown that there is an equilibrium, analogous to the contagious equilibria described in Kandori...

We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large finite number of players that allows for compact metric spaces of actions and types. This result is then used to generalize the purfication theorems of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983) and Kalai (2004). Our proofs are...

We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be suffcient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches

We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is benefcial to the other. The game is infnitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context, equality matching is...

Radzik (1991) showed that two-player games on compact intervals of the real line have { equilibria for all greater than 0, provided that payo functions are upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave. In an attempt to generalize this theorem, Ziad (1997) stated that the same is true for...