We consider anonymous games with a Lebesgue space of players in which either the action space or players' characteristics are denumerable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies. This...

Key Features:First book to describe recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibriumPresents research results in existence and stability of Nash equilibrium in an easily accessible manner.

We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games

We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an -perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing form the...

We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 - memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained by any 1 - memory subgame perfect equilibrium....

We show that a distribution of a game with a continuum of players is an equilibrium distribution if and only if there exists a sequence of symmetric approximate equilibrium distributions of games with finite support that converges to it. Thus, although not all games have symmetric equilibrium...

We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an n-equilibria, with n converging to zero. In our characterization, the sequence of finite games approaches the continuum game...

We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The properties we study are finite...

We will consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game depend on the stage-game references, although not necessarily in a time-consistent way. We will assume that each player's repeated game payoff function at each period of time is strictly increasing...

We simplify the stability notion for the two-sided, one-to-one matching setting in distributional form of Greinecker and Kah (2021). Their stability notion uses the product measure of a matching with itself and requires a certain ``instability'' set to be null. In contrast, our definition of...