We study the individual compliance behavior of polluting firms in an experimental setting under two different penalty functions (a linear and a strictly convex) and two different regulatory instruments (emission standards and tradable pollution permits). We find that a convex penalty, as...

Using experiments in which participants play the role of polluting firms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits under two types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We find that the market price of pollution permits and the probability of violating permits holdings are...

Using experiments in which participants play the role of polluting firms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits under two types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We find that the market price of pollution permits and the probability of violating permits holdings are...

We present the results of a series of laboratory economic experiments designed to study compliance behavior of polluting firms when information on the penalty is uncertain. The experiments consist of a regulatory environment in which university students face emission standards and an enforcement...

Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the...

We study individual compliance behavior with respect to a legal norm in an experimental setting under two different regulatory instruments: emission standards and tradable pollution permits. Compliance to the same set of standards and expected permit holdings was induced with different...