Over the last two decades, the use of antidumping (AD) measures has been characterized by two main features. First and foremost, it has increased dramatically. Additionally, it has not - to a large extent - been used to counteract the existence of dumping, but rather in a strategic or...

The acyclicity of individual improvements in a generalized congestion game (where the sums of local utilities are replaced with arbitrary aggregation rules) can be established with a Rosenthal-style construction if aggregation rules of all players are "quasi-separable." Every universal separable...

We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage- game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage- game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the distribution of actions of his opponents in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence...

The paper proposes a model of coopetitive-game (of normal-form type) within a perspective of economic growth and devote it to Greek crisis. The model is conceived at a macro level and its main aim is that of rebalancing the current-account of Greece. We construct the game trying to represent...

A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria were defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante)...

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated...

This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated...

In the present work, we propose a coopetitive model applied to the Greek crisis, which aims both at improving the competitiveness of the Greek productive system and rebalancing the current account balance of the country. Our model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) is conceived at...