Personal data protection regulations typically require a seller to obtain consumers' explicit consent before processing their information. We model this requirement as an anonymous option, allowing consumers to maintain their anonymity when purchasing a product from a seller. We analyze a...

In a two-period model with repeat purchase, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior-based pricing (BBP) and uniform pricing in a monopoly under quality uncertainty. We offer the novel insight that BBP increases the price elasticity of imitation demand and lowers the...

We analyze a credence goods market where the expert may have a high or low cost in repairing a major problem, under the assumptions that i) the expert is liable for the outcome of the treatment (liability), and ii) the type of treatment is (or is not) verifiable by the consumer (verifiability)....

We analyze the interaction between the signaling role of prices and a monopolist's incentive to use behavior-based pricing (BBP) in a two-period model with quality uncertainty. We obtain the novel insight that BBP increases the price elasticity of imitation demand, lowers the signaling cost...

Privacy regulations require that sellers obtain explicit consumer consent before collecting personal data. We formalize this requirement by introducing an anonymous option, which allows consumers to maintain anonymity during transactions. In a repeated-purchase model under limited commitment, we...

This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but...

When procuring multiple products from competing firms, a buyer may choose separate purchase, pure bundling, or mixed bundling. We show that pure bundling will generate higher buyer surplus than both separate purchase and mixed bundling, provided that trade for each good is likely to be...