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We conduct a laboratory study of the group-on group ultimatum bargaining with restricted within-group interaction. In this context, we concentrate on the effect of different within-group voting procedures on the bargaining outcomes. Our experimental observations can be summarized in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015248649
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). We conduct a laboratory study of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413287
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society are result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). The purpose of this work is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005797730
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827839
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). We conduct a laboratory study of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125563
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010008041
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009576830
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003329586
This paper reports results of an experimental study of uniform and discriminatory auctions of multiple objects in an environment of publicly known common values. We find that the bidding behavior in the uniform case exhibits two clear regularities: agents consistently play weakly dominated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823231
This paper reports results of an experimental study of uniform multi-unit auctions in an environment of publicly known common values. We find that the bidding behavior exhibits two clear regularities: agents consistently play weakly dominated strategies by overbidding on the first unit and have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823307