coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders or whether fossil fuel is modeled as a consumer good or an intermediate good. … agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or … are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is that the choice of caps or taxes matters. International trade and tax …

play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders or whether fossil fuel is modeled as a consumer good or an intermediate good. … agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or … are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is that the choice of caps or taxes matters. International trade and tax …

climate coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders or whether fossil fuel is modeled as a consumer good or an … agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or … are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is that the choice of caps or taxes matters. International trade and tax …

of the standalone deposit purchase policy either no coalition is stable or the grand coalition is the only stable … coalition. If the two-instrument policy is implemented, all countries inside and outside the coalition are better off than in …

games with continuous strategy space -- 13. Coalition models : a first approach -- 14. Coalition models : a second approach … -- 15. Coalition models : a third approach -- 16. Summary and conclusions …