Where such behaviors as risk-taking and hard work are not subject to complete contracts, some distributions of assets (for instance the widespread use of tenancy) may preclude efficient contractual arrangements. In particular, the distribution of wealth may affect: (a) residual claimancy over...

A new measure of labor market tightness on workers' behavior--the employment rent--is modeled as a determinant of workplace conflict. An empirical estimate of the employment rent--workers' expected cost of job loss--is calculated. It is argued that the cost of job loss affects strike incidence....

In the advanced economies, a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the less well off, with the approval of the electorate. Economists have for the most part misunderstood this phenomenon due to their endorsement of an empirically implausible theory...

When asymmetry or non-verifiability of information, or non- excludability of users, makes contracts incomplete or unenforceable, and where for these and other reasons there are impediments to efficient bargaining, we show that private contracting will not generally assign the control of assets...

For Pranab Bardhan, whose contributions to science and to society are honored in this report, power is an essential analytical tool. Its exercise (for better or worse) redirects the course of development and affects the livelihoods of those whose voices and interests are never absent in...

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other...