Some people assign negative values for new products sold on laboratory auction blocks (i.e., irradiated meat). We explore bidding behavior in two Vickrey auctions when people have positive- and negative-induced values for the good. Aggregate bidding in the second-price auction is precise but...

We design an experiment to simulate how people make agricultural production decisions under three policy scenarios, each incorporating direct payments (DPs): ("a") price uncertainty without countercyclical payments (CCPs); ("b") price uncertainty with CCPs; and ("c") price uncertainty, CCPs, and...

Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar...

This study illustrates an application of experimental auction methods, using both experimental economics and experimental design, to evaluate consumer perceptions and willingness to pay (WTP) for fresh pork chops. We test and reject hypotheses that (a) market prices and consumers' WTP are...

This paper explores the origins of the strikingly high price premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. Our experimental design distinguishes between two explanations of this phenomenon: novelty of the experimental experience versus the novelty of the good, i.e., preference...