The systematic use of experience rating is an original feature of the U.S. unemployment benefit system. At first glance, it is likely that experience rating is not desirable in many European labor markets characterized by high firing costs.

In this article, we model a mechanism that makes delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers profitable. Power is exchanged for loyalty. The model is tested using a matched panel of French workers and firms. For these firms, we know at two dates (1986 and 1992) whether a...

We analyze how wage setting institutions and job-security provisions interact on unemployment. The assumption that wages are renegotiated by mutual agreement only is introduces in a matching model with endogenous job destruction a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in order to get wage profiles...

We consider a game where agents commit to action for two periods. This implies two different patterns of decisions: agents can synchronize or stagger their decisions. We compare the outcomes of both timing patterns, and show that spillovers and strategic interactions are crucial for such a...