We investigate how the contractibility of actions affecting the value of an asset affects asset ownership. We examine this by testing how on-board computer (OBC) adoption affects truck ownership. We develop and test the proposition that adoption should lead to less ownership by drivers,...

A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by...

What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...

We analyze the role of implicit contracts' (that is, informal agreements supported byquot; reputation rather than law) both within firms, for example in employment relationships between them, for example as hand-in-glove supplier relationships. We find that the optimalquot; organizational form...

SUBJECT AREAS: Consulting; Control systems; Incentives; Information services; Performance measurement; Profit centers; Transfer pricingCASE SETTING: 1992, San Francisco, CA USASan Francisco Bay Consulting leads the field of economic consulting and litigation support in the use of powerful...

The ten year survival rate for firms trading on the New York and American Stock Exchanges between 1963 and 1995 is only 61%. This paper explores the process by which firms come to be delisted. We calculate the returns of firms from ten years before delisting to their delisting date and show...

Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures...