We utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes. A Guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it. One year later, we ran a...

Can microfinance borrowers use the discipline of regular loan repayments in order to accumulate savings if prompted to do so? In an experiment, we offered commercial savings products to the microfinance borrowers of Guatemala’s largest public-sector bank. We find that giving these borrowers...

We present the results of a new laboratory experiment designed to mimic the ways in which credit bureaus will alter microfinance markets. Where loans are taken in groups, bureaus can build reputations for borrowers at the group or the individual level, and the optimal contract is not obvious. In...

This paper uses data from Uganda’s largest incumbent microfinance institution to analyze the impact of entry by competing lenders on client behavior. We first examine the geographic placement decisions of competitors, and find that placement decisions are strongly affected by...

We utilize a unique pair of experiments to study the precise ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter the outcome in a credit market. We formulate a general model in which the information set held by lenders, and what borrowers believe their lenders to know, enter separately....

This article uses data from Uganda's largest incumbent microfinance institution to analyse the impact of entry by competing lenders on client behaviour. We observe that rising competition does not lead to an increase in client dropout rate, but induces a decline in repayment performance and...