Our analysis of a game-theoretic model of liberal rights had two main purposes: First, we gave a characterization of Gibbard's solution to the liberal paradox in terms of a game equilibrium. Secondly, we asked for preference restrictions that can guarantee the existence of a Pareto-optimal...

Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper we analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. We demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e. the above-average...

Why is it that, in democracies, the poor do not expropriate the rich even though they outnumber them? In this paper the authors analyze the commonly held belief that the rich escape expropriation because they are economically powerful. They demonstrate that the economically powerful, i.e., the...