We conduct a discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan's Monthly Report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles. We find that the difference between the number of positive and negative expressions in the reports leads the leading index of the economy by approximately three...

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...

This paper offers a simple but rich framework to study communication subject to various constraints such as anonymity requirements, equal treatment of multiple agents, overconfidence of an expert, and garbling, by extending the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Common to these...

We examine the possibilities for communication between agents with divergent preferences in a noisy environment. Taking Crawford and Sobel’s [4] (noiseless) communication game as a reference point, we study a model in which there is a probability e ? (0, 1) that the received message is a...

We propose a model of the widely held firm where management may behave on behalf of shareholders even without external controls. The model shows that there exists a corporate governance mechanism inside the firm where workers are employed on a long-term basis. When effort of young workers...

type="main" xml:id="sjpe12054-abs-0001" <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>We analyse a labour-matching model with wage posting, where – reflecting institutional constraints – firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage...</p>

This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker (receiver) and an informed agent (sender) who have asymmetric beliefs (“confidence”) on the sender’s ability (“competence”) to observe the state of nature. We find that even when the material payoffs of...

This paper studies information transmission in social surveys where a welfare maximizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of individuals from a large population who have heterogeneous preferences. The population distribution of preferences is unknown and has to be estimated,...

We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where- refl ecting institutional constraints-fi rms cannot dfferentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the...