There are two parts to this paper. Part One introduces the subject of implementation, and provides applications (in particular, to the theory of contracts). This part is written so as to be accessible to the general reader. Part Two surveys the literature, and is somewhat more formal.

We propose a new bankruptcy procedure. Initially, a firm's debts are cancelled, and cash and non-cash bids are solicited for the "new" (all-equity) firm. Former claimants are given shares, or options to buy shares, in the new firm on the basis of absolute priority. Options are exercised once the...

The paper compares co-operative governance structure to outside ownership. The distinction between the two lies in who has residual rights of control. It is found that a co-operative becomes relatively less efficient as the environment becomes more competitive, and the interests of members...

The thesis of this paper is that human capital is inalienable: it cannot be bought or sold. Control of physical capital proved the means by which one agent influences another. That is, the pattern of property rights over physical assets is important in the determination of incentives. Recent...

Consider an entrepreneur whocneeds to raise funds from an investor, but cannot commit not to withdraw his human capital from the project. The possibility of a default or quit puts an upper bound on the total indebtedness from the entrepreneur to the investor at any date. We characterize the...

We propose a new bankruptcy procedure that makes use of multiple auctions. The procedure is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example, in developing economies, or in economies in transition) - although it can be used in all economies.

We analyse the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract - specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment - under the assumption that some debt...

This paper is a theoretical study into how credit constraints intereact with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. We construct a model of a dynamic economy in which lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless the debts are secured. In such an economy, durable...

We develop a model of hierarchies based on the allocation of authority. A firm's owners have ultimate authority over a firm's decisions, but they have limited time or capacity to exercise this authority. Hence owners must delegate authority to subordinates. However, these subordinates also have...