This paper demonstrates how a profitable, downstream merger can lower the merged entity's input price while raising that of its rivals, leading to an adverse effect on final consumers. This novel 'waterbed' result is surprising and very different to the unilateral and co-ordinated effects...

"In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant...

We consider a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer in which the efficient outcome calls for the buyer to purchase one unit from each seller in each period. We show that when the buyer's valuations between periods are linked by switching costs and at least one seller is financially...

Many retailers promise that they will not be undersold by rivals (price-matching guarantees) and extend their promise to include their own future prices (most-favored-customer clauses). This is puzzling because the extant literature has shown that each promise independently has the potential to...

Overview of the UK merger control regime -- Enterprises ceasing to be distinct -- The share of supply and turnover tests -- Relationship with the merger regulation -- Public interest mergers -- The phase I process -- The duty to refer and exceptions -- The phase II process -- The counterfactual...