Showing 1 - 10 of 22
This paper deals with price--cap regulation of a monopolistic distribution grid which sells a license to some retailer. The sale of the license is a long--term incomplete contract. Both the grid and the licensee engage in relationship--specific investments before the value and costs of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968179
Target-cost pricing has been a widely applied formula in defence contracting. If this type of pricing arrangement is chosen, the seller's ex-post profit consists of a fixed payment plus some share of the cost overrun, that is the difference between an ex--ante agreed estimation of the production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968184
This paper first presents various simple regulatory mechanisms, in particular Vogelsang and Finsinger's iterative mechanism and Shleifer's yardstick Regulation. Unfortunately, in practical applications of these simple mechanisms the regulated utility will be able to dodge the regulator's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968327
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968363
This paper investigates a procurement relationship between a welfare-oriented government and a private supplier. The agents face several versions of the trading good which differ in quality and production costs, and the differences between those items are undescribable ex ante. In presence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968417
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989576
In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989601
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first develop a contractarian theory of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of individuals. Hence, we depart from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989639
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004993087
This paper presents an analysis of a recently invented new form of price regulation. An index of prices of monopolistically supplied goods must never exceed the retail price index minus X. The main results of the chapter are as follows: (i) If the constant X is politically chosen, price-cap...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004993092