This paper addresses the question of delegation in a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information. If the person who has the power to act, the principal, doesn't have the necessary information to make the best possible decision, she can address herself to someone, the agent, who has this...

We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their...

This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole,1993) where the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the regulator. The wealth...

This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organization where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...

This article studies the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown marginal cost. The problem described differs from Baron and Myerson [1982] because we suppose that the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint may lead to the collapse of the...

This paper concentrates on the question of organizational design under asymmetric information. The design of the organization has two parts: first, communication channels between the members should be established and second, the tasks should be allocated to the party that performs it in the most...

This paper investigates the role of output quality control in a multi agent setting with moral hazard. The principal is in charge of a team of agents who produce the output. The marketing of this output can be either a success or entail huge losses. At the time of marketing the product, the...

In this paper we explain the apparent "diversification discount” of conglomerates without assuming inefficient-cross subsidisation through internal capital markets. Instead we assume that internal capital market efficiently redistributes scare resources across a conglomerate’s divisions...

In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity irrespective...

In this paper, we raise the following two questions: (1) do Belgian holding companies operate an internal capital market to transfer financial resources in between their subsidiaries? And if yes, (2) is the internal capital market efficient? To answer the first question, we check if the group...