Less than 10 percent of executives in large publicly traded firms are women. On average female executives earn less than male executives, and hold less senior positions. They retire earlier. This paper is an empirical study of these differences based on panel of about 2,500 firms and 16,000...

We develop a pure moral hazard model, and a closely related hybrid one, where there are both hidden actions and hidden information, to derive the restrictions from optimal contract theory that characterize set identification. In pure moral hazard models, the expected utility of managers is...

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less, hold more junior positions, and attrit faster. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze promotion and compensation rates. Given executive rank and background, women are paid more than...

This article investigates the paradox of insider information and performance pay as it pertains to managerial compensation. The paradox is that managers are permitted to exploit their role as insiders for personal financial gain when simple directives issued by their board of directors could...

This paper develops and implements a semiparametric estimator for investi-gating, with panel data, the importance of human capital accumulation, nonsep-arable preferences of females and child care costs on females life-cycle fertility and labor supply behaviors. It presents a model in which the...

The theory of moral hazard predicts that since the activities of managers are hard to monitor directly, managerial compensation is tied to the profitability of the firms they manage. In this empirical study we investigate the hypothesis that the secular trends in managerial compensation can be...

This paper develops and implements a semiparametric estimator for investigating, with panel data, the importance of human capital accumulation, non-separable preferences of females and child care costs on females life-cycle fertility and labor supply behaviors. It presents a model in which the...

This paper addresses two questions: What accounts for the gender gap in labor-market outcomes? What are the driving forces behind the changes in the gender-labor-market out- comes over the period 1968–97? It formulates a dynamic general equilibrium model of labor supply, occupational sorting...

This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in panel-data sample-selection models with a binary selection rule when the latent equations contain possibly predetermined variables, lags of the dependent variables, and unobserved individual effects. The selection equation...