According to one thesis the non profit enterprise (in short NPE) is able to attract ideological entrepreneurs and workers (Rose-Ackerman 1996). In fact I prove that without the ideological element, a simple game between the entrepreneur, worker and beneficiary is condemned to an opportunistic...

In this essay I suggest a first-best solution to the collusion problem in a three-levels principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy (Tirole 1986, Laffont-Tirole 1993) in the context of a repeated games model. I introduce a new player in the component game i.e. a group of consumers which is also...

This paper concerns the role that norms play in the emergence and selection of equilibrium points seen as social conventions under unforeseen contingencies – that is in the emergence of regularities of behaviour which are self-enforcing and effectively adhered to by limited rational agents due...

This paper first sets a definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an extended model of corporate governance and then accounts for a voluntary approach to CSR, meant as voluntary compliance with CSR strategic management standards, in terms of an economic theory of self-regulation...

We provide an account of the non profit enterprise based on the motivations of the agents involved. Our main idea is that these are ex -post motivated by both self-interest and a conditional willingness to conform to their ex ante accepted constitutional ideology, which are weighed up in a...

This paper first sets a definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an extended model of corporate governance and then accounts for a voluntary approach to CSR, meant as voluntary compliance with CSR strategic management standards, in terms of an economic theory of self-regulation....