Understanding how physicians respond to incentives from payment schemes is a central concern in health economics research. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse the influence of incentives from fee-for-service and capitation payments on physicians’ supply of medical...

The effects of unproductive lobbying have so far mainly been addressed by the public choice literature on rent-seeking and by Milgrom/Roberts' (1988,1990) work on influence activities in organizations. Our paper makes an attempt to incorporate lobbying into the simple principal-agent framework...

This paper reports on RatDemo, an example program for the application of RatImage, the Research Assistance Toolbox for computerized human behavior experiments. The complete source code of this short experiment program is listed and briefly discussed. Since RatDemo combines several central...

This paper reports on RatImage, version 3.30. The extended features are presented. RatImage 3.30 is fully downward compatible to the first published version of the Research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behaivor experiments, RatImage 3.10. This paper is an addendum to the manula of...

On the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour. Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis, strategic reasoning and strategy construction...

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) a reciprocity relationship between briber and public official, (2) negative welfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. We separate the influences of these factors in an experiment. In a two-player game reciprocation is economically...

The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited...

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...

In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes inefficiencies and lowers incentives and accordingly is not in the principal’s interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective tournament where output in a team is generated through a...

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...