This paper studies optimal taxation in a class of economies in which agents have dispersed private information regarding aggregate shocks (commonly-relevant fundamentals such as aggregate productivity and demand conditions). The dispersion of information opens the door to inefficiencies that...

Our analysis offers a different rationale for the failure of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem than that of Naito (1999). Moreover, our results are in sharp contrast to those of Saez (2004) and Scheuer (2012), who considers an occupational choice model where workers have heterogeneous idiosyncratic...

two mechanisms that implement the same allocation rule must yield the same expected payoffs to the agents and hence the same expected revenue regardless of the transfer scheme and of the information disclosed by the mechanism to the agents. We then use the result as a tool for designing profit...

We characterize the optimal incentive scheme for a manager who faces costly effort decisions and whose ability to generate profits for the fim varies stochastically over time. The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic mechanism design problem with hidden actions and...

This paper studies second-degree price discrimination in matching markets, that is, in markets where the product sold by the monopolist is access to other agents. In order to investigate the optimality of a large variety of pricing strategies, we allow for any many-to-many matching rule that...