We put forward a plausible explanation of African financial under-development in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. Utilising an appropriately modified IO model of banking, we show that the root of the problem could be unchecked moral hazard (strategic loan defaults) or adverse...

Empirical evaluation of macroeconomic uncertainties and their use for probabilistic forecasting are investigated. A new weighted skew normal distribution which parameters are interpretable in relation to monetary policy outcomes and actions is proposed. This distribution is fitted to recursively...

This paper examines the relationship between the ‘exclusion’ type core inflation measures and the stability price index. Empirical results for Malaysia and Pakistan suggests that, if targeting core inflation index is to stabilize output, weights of the export-oriented sectors (energy for...

The paper aims at assessing the forecast risk and the maximum admissible forecast horizon for the non-systematic component of inflation modeled autoregressively, where a distortion is caused by a simple first-order bilinear process. The concept of the guaranteed upper risk of forecasting and the...

The paper analyses inflationary real effects in situation where there are frequent episodes of high inflation. It is conjectured with the increase in high inflation, and when differences between the expected and output-neutral inflation become large, output stimulation through inflationary...

This paper considers the effectiveness of monetary policy committee voting when the inflation forecast signals, upon which decisions are based, may be subject to manipulation. Using a discrete time intertemporal model, we examine the distortions resulting from such manipulation under a three-way...

Issues related to classification, interpretation and estimation of inflationary uncertainties are addressed in the context of their application for constructing probability forecasts of inflation. It is shown that confusions in defining uncertainties lead to potential misunderstandings of such...

We present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market...

The paper tackles the issue of possible misspecification in fitting skew normal distributions to empirical data. It is shown, through numerical experiments, that it is easy to choose a distribution which is different from this which actually generated the sample, if the minimum distance...

We put forward a plausible explanation of African financial underdevelopment in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. Utilising an appropriately modified IO model of banking, we show that the root of the problem could be unchecked moral hazard (strategic loan defaults) or adverse...