Prior research generally argues that managers issue management earnings forecasts (MFs) to secure capital market benefits (i.e., reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors to lower a firm's cost of capital), to reduce the firm's litigation costs, or to allow managers to trade...

Prior studies identify several motives for why firms release management earnings forecasts (MFs). A common feature of such studies is they pool MFs when drawing inferences about a specific motive. By ignoring the heterogeneous rationales managers have to issue MFs, pooling could lead to biased...

We exploit a novel feature of management cash flow forecasts (MCFFs) to investigate how managers' discretion over forecast precision, clarity, and verifiability affects the bias, quality, and stock price effects of such forecasts. Many MCFFs are issued with an equivocal definition of the cash...

Managers' voluntary disclosure of forward-looking earnings information results in stock prices reflecting that information prior to the fiscal period when the corresponding earnings are announced. We predict that forward-looking management earnings forecasts (MFs) will lead to a weaker relation...

We draw on Merton (1987) to develop predictions for the benefits of voluntary disclosures made by firms pursuing an initial public offering (IPO) prior to when they begin to provide regulated financial information via their IPO prospectus. We find that voluntarily issuing press releases and...