There are examples of entry in two-sided markets, where first entrants occupy a `central location' and serve agents with `intermediate tastes', while later entrants are niche players. Why would the first entrant choose to become a `general' platform, given that later entrants will not have...

We propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases (i.e., one unit from each firm). This model may fit many markets (e.g. newspapers, credit cards) better than existing models. A common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand,...

There are examples of entry in two-sided markets, where first entrants occupy a ‘central location’ and serve agents with ‘intermediate tastes,’ while later entrants are niche players. Why would the first entrant choose to become a ‘general’ platform, given that later entrants will...

In a duopoly model of horizontal and vertical differentiation, where consumers are ex-ante unaware of product qualities, we study the firms' incentives to signal quality via prices. Consumers, after they observe prices, can evaluate a firm's product quality before purchase if they incur a search...