In an incomplete contract setting, we analyze the contracting out of public service provision, comparing the performance of for-profit and not-for-profit private firms. Two institutional arrangements are considered, control rights lying either with the firm as under the UK’s Private Finance...

In a public procurement setting, we discuss the desirability of completing contracts with state-contingent clauses providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the contractor and this creates agency costs of...

In a public procurement setting, we discuss the desirability of completing contracts with state-contingent clauses providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the contractor and this creates agency costs of...

We use an incomplete-contract approach to compare contracting out by a public sector agency with the delegation of contracting out to a public-private partnership (PPP) that is a joint venture between private and sector agents. The PPP maximizes a linear combination of profit and social benefit....

We consider an industry characterized by a regulated natural monopoly in the upstream market and Cournot competition with demand uncertainty in the unregulated downstream market. The realization of demand cannot be observed by the regulator, whilst it can be privately observed at some cost by...

Building upon Iossa and Martimort (2008), we study the main incentive issues and the form of optimal contracts for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in transports. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse firm chooses unobservable efforts in...

We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse agent chooses unobservable efforts...

We provide a new explanation for commercial activities by non-profit organizations whose primary concern is to supply mission output. Starting from the observation that donations to individual non-profits are often highly volatile, we show how investment in commercial activity can constitute a...

In an incomplete-contract setting, we analyse the contracting out of public service provision, comparing the performance of for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NP) firms. Two institutional arrangements are considered, control rights lying either with the firm (PPP) or the government (traditional...

We provide a new rationale for commercial activities by non-profit organizations whose primary concern is to supply mission output. We show that investment in commercial activity may be used to insure mission output against the uncertainty of donations, though possibly at the cost of lower...