Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) first showed that compensation for takings can lead to a moral hazard problem that results in overinvestment in land suitable for public use. To the contrary, this paper shows that the compensation rule is irrelevant regarding the level of investment...

State and religion, two of the oldest institutions known to mankind, have historically had a close relationship with each other, often joining forces to rule populations. Although the tendency towards secularization has hampered this relationship in recent centuries, the state-religion alliance...

The holdup and holdout problems arise in different contexts, but they share certain fundamental similarities that have not generally been recognized. In particular, both involve activities requiring an up-front, non-salvageable investment, and both require the investor to purchase an input, the...

This paper examines markets, firms, and the law as alternative institutional arrangements for organizing transactions that involve transaction-specific investments and uncertain performance. The analysis is the logical extension of Coase's seminal examination of the market-firm boundary on one...

A regulatory taking occurs when a government regulation reduces the value of private property to such a degree that the owner is entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. This chapter reviews legal and economic theories aimed at determining when a regulation crosses the...

The Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London (2005) authorized the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment projects provided that there are sufficient spillover benefits to the public in the form of enhanced taxes and new jobs. This paper examines the economic basis for this...

The holdup and holdout problems arise in different contexts, but they share certain fundamental similarities that have not generally been recognized. In particular, both involve activities requiring an up-front, non-salvageable investment, and both require the investor to purchase an input, the...

An expanding state has to decide how to tax the newly conquered lands, most likely taxed under a different regime. It can either preserve the prevailing system of taxation or change it to conform to its own system. The choice depends on the relative efficiency of the two systems, political...

Throughout history, religious and political authorities have had a mysterious attraction to each other. Rulers have established state religions and adopted laws with religious origins, sometimes even claiming to have divine powers. We propose a political economy approach to theocracy, centered...

This essay examines the historiography of two episodes in history – the scattering of plots in the open fields in the Middle Ages and the transition to the factory system in the Industrial Revolution – to shed light on the uses of institutional economics in economic history. In both of these...