This paper explores the indirect in‡ationary mechanism allowed byloss leaders banning laws. In a model where a monopolist producer sells his productthrough vertically separated and di¤erentiated retailers, we show that the ban of resaleat a loss can be used strategically by the producer to...

This paper analyzes the impact of a merger in the French retail sector on food prices, using a consumer panel data. We perform a difference-in-differences analysis by comparing price changes in stores for which the local market structure is affected by the merger to unaffected stores. In...

This paper studies horizontal mergers in vertically related markets. In atwo-level Cournot model, with an intermediate and a final market, we show thatdownstream mergers inducing size effects are, ceteris paribus, more profitablethan upstream ones. Moreover, a merger at one level reduces the...

We examine the impact of horizontal and vertical market structure on product variety. Weconsider a market for horizontally differentiated products where the cost of launching a newproduct is fixed and spread between the manufacturing and the retail industries. We show thata vertically integrated...

We show that resale-below-cost laws enable producers to impose price-floors toretailers. This mechanism suppresses downstream competition but also and moresurprisingly dampens upstream competition, leading to higher prices and lower welfare.This article also shows that a price-floor implements...

While vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold-up problem, this paper highlights instead that it can generate hold-up problems — for rivals. We first consider a successive duopoly where competition among suppliers eliminates any risk of hold-up; downstreamfirms thus...